Counterintelligence and Insecure Cognitions: The Case of Robert P. Hanssen by Editor, IBPP
International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology 
Volume 10 Issue 8 Article 2 
3-2-2001 
Counterintelligence and Insecure Cognitions: The Case of Robert 
P. Hanssen 
Editor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Editor (2001) "Counterintelligence and Insecure Cognitions: The Case of Robert P. Hanssen," International 
Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 10 : Iss. 8 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol10/iss8/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology  
 
1 
 
Title: Counterintelligence and Insecure Cognitions: The Case of Robert P. Hanssen 
Author: Editor 
Volume: 10 
Issue: 8 
Date: 2001-03-02  
Keywords: Counterintelligence, Espionage, Hanssen, Personnel Security, Trust 
 
Abstract. This article identifies cognitions harbored as security-philic beliefs by well-meaning 
policymakers but associated with even greater security vulnerability.  
 
As is the case with public unmaskings of United States (US) citizens who have betrayed their 
government's trust, the case of Robert P. Hanssen--a counterintelligence expert within the US Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who allegedly passed highly classified information to the Soviet Union and 
later Russia for 15 years--has elicited a wealth of suggestions to prevent such an event from occurring 
again. However, these suggestions exemplify cognitions as security beliefs that contraindicate security.  
 
For example, one suggestion is to ensure that anyone with access to information being compromised be 
placed under suspicion and investigated. In this way, the guilty culprit can be more quickly identified. 
However, it may be quite difficult to know what information is being or has been compromised. What is 
often known is that certain events are occurring that are hurtful to US security--although even this may 
not be the case when seemingly positively perceived events have unrecognized negative consequences. 
The information that would need to be known to cause events hurtful to security--and, thus, achieve the 
potential status of being compromised--must be generated through a number of assumptions each 
possessing various error rates that may change through time. Even if the information can be 
ascertained, the number of individuals who might have access to all or some of it may be too large for 
effective investigation or even unknowable. Or the information may have been developed independent 
of the compromised information. Moreover, the buck needs to stop somewhere. This means that, 
eventually, some individuals must be considered above suspicion. If not, a continuous and poisonous 
circle of suspicion ever widens without a means for ultimate adjudication. And whether the buck stops 
somewhere or not, the frequent incomplete and ambiguous status of what needs to be and is known to 
know becomes a breeding ground for corruption, nepotism, careerism, the acting out of psychodynamic 
conflict, and the exemplification of bias.  
 
As another example, much has been made of the FBI's culture of trust inhibiting efforts to install " 
adequate safeguards" against betrayal of trust. However, can an organization be viable and successful 
when all its members are suspected of treachery? And is it even realistic to assume that--regardless of 
an official culture of distrust--there would not be trusting alliances between and among at least some 
individuals as a manifestation of human psychology?  
 
As to "adequate safeguards," the very term seems to imply that there is a way to prevent behavioral 
manifestations of betrayal of trust. The history of all variants of political organizations would suggest 
otherwise. If, instead, the term implies some acceptable rate of betrayal, the social psychological 
sequelae in the public realm of each and every betrayal episode would suggest otherwise.  
 
Still other suggestions seem to indicate a less than optimal understanding of security and intelligence 
operations. For example, some suggest that counterintelligence information should be more carefully 
compartmented so that counterintelligence operatives will be less likely to have information that they 
shouldn't have. However, betrayal of trust can still occur with the information operatives are entitled to 
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have. Merely decreasing the information that they should have may limit what can be compromised but 
may also limit how valuable the operatives can be to the US and how successfully they can do their job. 
Moreover, the very term, "counterintelligence information" suggests that such information can be easily 
identified and tagged. Yet, the challenge and very dilemma of the counterintelligence operative is that 
any element of information may have counterintelligence value. This problem is compounded by the 
phenomenon in which classified information "should really" be unclassified, the converse of this 
phenomenon, and the fluctuation through time of both phenomena.  
 
Finally, there are suggestions that more funding, people, time, and materiel should be allocated for 
counterintelligence activities to minimize future threats. Obviously, increased expenditures by 
themselves may have no security effect or even a deleterious one. As well, with finite funding 
throughout the US Government, more resources allocated for counterintelligence mean less for other 
purposes. Even within the counterintelligence world, more for security purposes means less for other 
aspects of the counterintelligence mission.  
 
A final suggestion, but one not often ventured, is that nothing needs to be fixed. Suggesting otherwise 
may be necessary even by FBI authorities--for political purposes. But security policymakers might 
consider accepting that the world is not completely predictable or controllable but may still be the best 
it can be. (See Birner, L. (1992). Betrayal: A major psychological problem of our times. Psychotherapy 
Patient, 8, 41-52; Danoff, L. (2000). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Law enforcement's secret 
weapon. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, 28, 213-224; Elangovan, A.R., & 
Shapiro, D.L. (1998). Betrayal of trust in organizations. Academy of Management Review, 23, 547-566; 
Jones, W.H., Couch, L., & Scott, S. (1997). Trust and betrayal: The psychology of getting along and getting 
ahead. In R. Hogan & J.A. Johnson, (Eds.). Handbook of personality psychology. (pp. 465-482). Academic 
Press; Sarbin, T.R., & Carney, R. (Eds.). (1994). Citizen espionage: Studies in trust and betrayal. Praeger 
Publishers; Security at the F.B.I. (February 24, 2001). The New York Times, p. A24; United States of 
America v. Robert Philip Hanssen. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant and Search 
Warrants. In in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division.) 
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